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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court 
for the Fifth Judicial Court of Beaver County. This appeal seeks 
review of a Judgment entered on May 16, 1995. 
This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code 
§78-2-2 (3) (j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OP REVIEW 
(1) Did the Court err in holding that a long existing fence 
had not become a boundary by acquiescence? 
The factual determinations of the trial court will not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Grayson Roper Ltd.Partnership 
VS. Pinlinson 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
(2) Did the Court err in holding that Defendants did not 
commit a trespass on Plaintiff's property? 
The trial court's determination as to the applicable law is 
reviewed for correctness. Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. vs. Dixie 
Power and Water, Inc. 789 P.2d 24, 25(Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Appellant believes that there are no constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations that are 
determinative. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for trespass brought by Appellants, 
("Parkinson and Larsen") against Appellees ("Rikers"). They claim 
that Rikers destroyed a long existing fence and irrigation ditch 
and built a road on property on Parkinson and Larsenfs side of the 
fence which has been in place for more than fifty years; that the 
fence which approximates the quarter section line, if not the 
quarter section line, defines a boundary by acquiescence. 
Defendants claim that a survey they commissioned establishes 
that there is a deeded right-of-way on the disputed land for their 
use. They counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to the disputed 
property in their favor. The trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs1 
trespass action finding there was no evidence the fence was a 
boundary fence and that Defendants had built the road on a deeded 
right-of-way. The court made no ruling on Defendants' counterclaim 
for quiet title. Parkinson and Larsen appealed from the 
dismissal of their complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rikers purchased a twenty acre parcel from Myrl P. Lessing 
("Lessing") by warranty deed recorded July 28, 1989. (R., p. 157, 
Exhibit 39) . The parcel is located east of an old fence which 
runs north and south generally along the quarter section line. It 
is described in the deed as follows: 
The South half of the Northeast (sic) quarter, of the Northwest 
quarter of Section 10, Township 29 South, Range 7 West, Salt 
lake Base and Meridian. 
2 
Parkinson and Larsen, as well as others who were not parties 
to this action, own parcels which are west of the fence. 
Lessing had acquired title to the parcel by a Partition Order 
issued by the Fifth Judicial District Court for Beaver County 
entered August 8, 1987, and recorded September 25, 1987. (R. , p. 
157, Exhibit D-15). The grant to Lessing in the Partition Order 
included a right-of-way for access across two other parcels created 
by the Partition Order which lie east of Lessing's parcel. (R. , p. 
157, Exhibit D-15, paragraph e.) 
The deed from Lessing to Rikers (Exhibit 39) included the 
right-of-way which was granted to Lessing by the Court order. It 
is described in the deed as follows: 
"TOGETHER WITH a 30 foot right-of-way conveyed to the granter 
herein from the Southeast corner of the above described 
property, running Easterly to the County Road." 
The deed also described a right-of-way which approached the 
property from the south. The right-of-way is described as 
follows: 
"Beginning 80 rods East of the West 1/4 corner of Section 10, 
Township 29 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 120 rods; thence east 30 feet; thence South 120 
rods; thence West 3 0 feet to beginning." 
Rikers, residents of California at the time of the purchase, 
were nonetheless familiar with the property. Defendant, Jesse 
Riker, testified that he was a general contractor in California and 
that in 1980 he designed and helped build a house for Ronnie 
Anderson on property which adjoined the Lessing property to the 
north. At that time he walked the Lessing property. Every time 
he came to Utah he looked at the property and tried to find out if 
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he could buy it "because it was tied up in court with the death.11 
He testified that he was concerned with the "pretty corner" with 
"all those oak trees" where he now has his house; that he didn't 
care about the rest of the property. (Trial transcript, 3/7/95, 
pp.109-113). 
Jesse Riker also testified that when he had been at the 
property he had observed the fence in question; that the fence had 
no bearing on the purchase or use he intended to make of the 
Lessing property. (Trial transcript, 3/7/95, pp. 117-118). 
Further, that Rikers used an east/west access to their residence 
until the property was subdivided in 1990. A parcel was sold to 
a buyer from California who closed off Rikers' access. (Trial 
transcript, 3/7/95, pp. 130-131). Jesse Riker told Hazel Larsen 
that he then "had no way of getting to [his] home. "(Trial 
transcript, 3/7/95, p. 128), The deed Rikers received from 
Lessing still provided the east/west right-of-way directly to a 
county road which was granted in the Partition Order. 
(Exhibit D-39). 
Mike Dalton, a title officer testified for the Rikers as to 
documents he had retrieved from the Office of the Beaver County 
Recorder. He concluded from his examination that Arnold 
Parkinson, father of Foch Parkinson, had acquired ownership of the 
property east of the fence in 1919 and 1928 referring to Exhibit D-
26 and Exhibit D-27. He also identified Exhibit D-28, indicating 
that it was a certified copy of a deed which involved property 
which was included in the partition action , but was not involved 
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in the suit. However, he failed to refer to another deed on the 
same exhibit; that deed is in the direct chain of title to the 
property now owned by plaintiffs ( and a portion of the property 
now owned by the other Californian who cut off Rikers1 access). 
That deed, dated March 29, 1944, and recorded November 29, 1950, 
describes the east line of the property conveyed as "the fence" and 
the south boundary as "the north side of the county road". (R. , 
p.157, Exhibit D-28). The fence is the one in question in this 
action. The county road is the one shown as the south boundary of 
Plaintiff Larsen's parcel. 
Plaintiff Hazel Larsen testified that she owned a farm and an 
upholstery shop. She testified as to her direct knowledge of the 
fence as follows: 
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. . .what we have always known for all our life as the boundary 
line going up this old fence line here...north and south." (Trial 
transcript, 6/21/94 pp. 22-23, emphasis added.) 
She further testified that there was an old right-of-way to 
Rikers property which was on the east side of the fence through an 
existing gate. (Id, pp.24-29). She identified exhibit P-3 
stating: 
A. It shows the old fence line — the old road on the east 
side of what we thought was the boundary fence. 
Q. Does it show the fence? 
A. Yes it does. 
She described the property the plaintiffs lost by Rikers 
building the new road west of the torn down fence as 71 feet wide 
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on one end and approximately 3 0 feet on the other end. (Id, pp. 
34). 
Plaintiff Foch Parkinson testified that he was 76, a farmer 
and owned a truck wash; that he formerly was in the dairy business 
and a trader of horses and cattle; that he could remember the 
property since when he was a child. (Id., pp. 57-58). 
He further testified that the right-of-way through the gate 
east of the old fence had been there all of his life. That he had 
used it as had "all the people that had an interest in the Johnny 
Smith ditch..." (Id., pp. 62-65). When asked how his property 
was separated from other owners he replied, "Well, they've got 
fences between us." ( Id, p. 61). 
James Parkinson testified for the plaintiffs that he was 40 
years old and that he had been on the property most of his life. 
With respect to the fence he testified that: 
"...the property that I acquired used to belong to the Limbs. 
It was a—a property line between them and my grandfather. It 
was a boundary line." (Trial transcript, 3/7/95 p. 15, emphasis 
added). He further testified that after the partition order the 
fence was recognized as a boundary line. His testimony, referring 
to the grantees in the Partition Order was: 
Q. ...Now, what purpose did the fence serve among those 
parties? 
A. It was a boundary line from — when they broke up the 
estate, everybody got from that fence — some got some on the west 
side of it, and some got some on the east side of it.... 
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Q. You say that it was a boundary line when they broke up 
the estate, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. What was it before that? 
A. Well, it was a boundary line. Because my father did not 
own this property. He acquired it later... It was a boundary line. 
Q. During the period of time that you were acquainted with 
the property and the fence, did you know of any use that was made 
of it? 
A. It was a property line and to keep other animals off 
this guy's property. 
THE COURT: Which guy? 
THE WITNESS: The guy that owned this years ago. (Trial 
transcript, 3/7/95, p. 17-18, emphasis added). 
James Parkinson then identified Exhibit P-21, a photograph 
which he testified: "It shows a — a picture of the old fence and 
the old wooden gate we used to go through on the east side of the 
old fence." He further testified that the photograph showed the 
fence which he had already described as the boundary line and a 
roadway. With respect to the roadway he testified: 
Q. All right. Now, P-21 — what do you know about the 
roadway depicted in P-21? 
A. That's the — the access road getting into these other 
properties. 
Q. All right. And who put that in? 
A. I have no idea. It's been there all my life. (Id,pp. 25-27) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In determining whether there was a boundary by acquiescence 
the court should have (1) considered the testimony of Plaintiffs1 
three witnesses to the effect that a long existing fence was 
recognized as a boundary; (2) considered a 1944 deed to Plaintiffs1 
predecessor in title that used the fence in describing the east 
boundary of the property conveyed• 
Public policy favors the determination of boundaries based 
upon historic, peaceable usage instead of by a survey which 
prorates distances and creates a detached strip of land which 
adversely affects other property owners not involved in this 
action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS PROVED THAT THE FENCE WAS A BOUNDARY. 
Defendants produced no evidence to refute the testimony of the 
plaintiffs1 witnesses that the fence that Defendants tore down was 
a boundary fence. As shown above, the record contains the 
testimony of three witnesses who had grown up on the property that 
the fence was a boundary between the neighbors on either side. 
There is a four pronged test to determine a boundary by 
acquiescence. The elements of boundary by acquiescence are: 
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence to the line as a boundary; (3) 
for a long period of time, generally not less than 2 0 years; (4) by 
adjoining landowners. Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P. 2d 801 (Ct. App. 
1994) citing from Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420. 
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The trial court found that the first element had been 
established. The court, however, found that plaintiffs had failed 
to prove the second element- "mutual acquiescence to the line as a 
boundary". The court addressed this element as follows: 
"There must be mutual acquiescence in the fence in this 
case as a boundary. That has not — not been proven by the 
plaintiff. I have no evidence whatsoever as to who put in 
the fence or for what purpose. I donft even no when it was 
put in." (Trial transcript, 3/7/95, p. 140 emphasis added.) 
The court did not comment on the third element, the length of 
time, but did comment on the fourth-"by adjoining land owners." 
The court stated: 
"the evidence I do have shows that the same person owned both 
sides of the fence as early as 1925, as I recall." (The court 
corrected the date, after comment by the defendant1 counsel, 
to 1928.) 
The court continued, 
"Obviously there can't be a boundary by acquiescence 
where a fence runs through property owned on both sides by the 
same owner. You can't agree by yourself to make this a 
boundary across your own property. That's nonsensical. 
Besides which, the fourth element of boundary by acquiescence 
is that it has to be a boundary between adjoining property 
owners. And those have to be different property owners. So 
there has been no evidence that the fence was ever intended as 
a boundary by whoever put it in. And we don't know who that 
was. (Id, p. 141). 
Finally, the court concluded: 
"Now the question becomes did anybody in the intervening 
years from the time it was put in until now mutually agree 
that that was going to be the boundary of the property. I 
have no evidence that that's ever taken place. We've had 
lots of people own property along that fence on both sides, 
but I have no evidence that anybody ever agreed that was going 
to be a boundary line. The fence has just sat there, and 
people have bought and taken title to property in accordance 
with the general legal descriptions that are laid out by 
survey. No evidence has been presented that would indicate 
that anybody ever agreed that that fence line was going to be 
the boundary between these two pieces of property at any point 
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versus the — the survey line." (Id., p.141 emphasis added). 
The trial court placed too great a burden of proof on the 
plaintiffs. Earlier decisions of this Court make it clear that the 
party claiming a boundary by acquiescence does not have to prove 
when a long standing fence or other monument was erected or by 
whom. Because there are often no living witnesses to construction 
or usage of long existing fences and the like, this Court held in 
Jensen v. Bartlett, 286 P.2d 804, (Utah 1955) that: 
"It is well recognized by this court that where the 
parties have acquiesced in a fence as marking the boundary line for 
a long period of time, it is immaterial whether there was an 
express agreement to that effect or not. Under such proof the 
court will indulge a fiction, or hold there is a presumption that 
such an agreement existed." (citations omitted). 
As discussed above, the deed from Lessing to the Rikers 
contained two separate right-of-way descriptions. One which the 
court order established in the partition action and a second one 
which accessed the property from the south on the dividing line 
between Plaintiffs and neighbors to the west. Defendants hired a 
surveyor, Marcus A. Twedt, to locate the second right-of-way. 
The survey done by Twedt was marked Exhibit D-l and was 
received into evidence. The survey map, copy of which here 
follows on page 11-A, contains the following under "Narrative": 
"PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS SURVEY IS TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION 
OF THE 3 0 • DEEDED RIGHT-OF-WAY. ALL BUT TWO SECTION CORNERS 
LOCATED BY PRO-RATING DISTANCE FROM CORNER SECTIONS..." 
Plaintiffs1 witness, James Parkinson testified that he had 
found a BLM marker which was 18 feet from the one set by Twedt. 
He also testified that by measuring from the BLM marker the 
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distance "comes out right — real close to that old gate. Within 
a few feet, ( Referring to the gate which he had identified in 
Exhibits P-7 and P-21.)(Trial transcript, 3/7/95, p. 43) 
Reproductions of Exhibits P-21 which shows the gate, P-3, which 
depicts the old road as it continues northward from the gate and 
Exhibit P-13, which shows the road which Rikers built west of the 
fence and old road, are shown on page 11-B here following. 
II. THE FINDING THAT BOTH SIDES OF THE FENCE WERE OWNED BY 
PLAINTIFFS1 PREDECESSOR IN TITLE IS INCORRECT. 
The trial court relied on the testimony of defendant's 
witness, Michael Dalton, to conclude that the property now owned by 
plaintiffs was acquired by Arnold Parkinson between 1919 and 1928; 
that he also owned property on the west side of the old fence at 
the same time. Dalton, however, neglected to take into 
consideration a later deed in which Arnold Parkinson was the 
grantee; a deed which referred to the old fence as the east 
boundary of the property now owned by plaintiffs and others. 
(Exhibit D-28). Although the chain of title in the record is not 
complete, it is clear that sometime between 1928 and 1944 Arnold 
Parkinson sold (or perhaps during the depression years lost) the 
property now owned by plaintiffs. Later, in 1944, he reacquired 
the property by a deed which clearly recognized the fence as the 
east boundary of the property conveyed. Accordingly, the court's 
findings that "...there can't be a boundary by acquiescence where 
a fence runs through property owned on both sides by the same 
owner" and "no evidence has been presented that would indicate that 
anybody ever agreed that the fence line was going to be the 
11 
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boundary between these two pieces of property at any point versus 
the — survey line" ( Trial transcript, 3/7/95, p.141) are clearly 
incorrect when the 1944 deed is taken into consideration. 
III. ACCEPTING THE TWEDT SURVEY AS THE CORRECT BOUNDARY WOULD 
SPAWN ADDITIONAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES, 
As noted above the Twedt survey was done for the purpose of 
locating the right-of-way and not for establishing the boundary. 
Twedt noted on the map (Exhibit D-l) that only two section corners 
were located; that the other corners were established by pro-
ration. Twedt!s establishing the boundaries by proration rather 
than reliance on the metes and bounds descriptions and references 
to monuments, such as in the 1944 deed which used the fence and the 
county road as boundary lines (Exhibit D-28), causes an 
unacceptable side effect. His survey results in the acquisition 
by plaintiffs, and all the rest of the property owners west of the 
old fence, of a thin strip of land on the west side of "Old Highway 
91". It would be disturbing news to the owners on the west side 
of the highway that they have no highway frontage. If plaintiffs 
or the other property owners were to assert ownership to the 
windfall highway frontage more litigation would be the result. 
Where does it end? At the Utah-Nevada border? 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the "doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence rests on sound public policy of avoiding 
trouble and litigation over boundaries." Ekberg v. Bates, 239 P.2d 
205 (Utah 1951). 
Here, the Rikers who came to Utah in 1989 to build a house in 
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the "pretty corner" and who didn't care about the rest of the 
property (Trial transcript, 3/7/95, pp. 109-113) have knocked down 
a fence and bulldozed an irrigation ditch rather than improve an 
existing road which neighbors for years have recognized and used 
peaceably. 
Some people travel west to Utah, admire its beauty and say it 
should be wilderness; untouched by man. Others move east to Utah 
to escape congested, crime-infested coastal cities. Too many 
come to Utah with little regard for the rights of farmers, 
ranchers, and other descendants of pioneers who have lived 
peaceably as neighbors for generations. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it failed to establish a boundary 
by acquiescence. This Court should remand this case to the trial 
court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs 
establishing the old fence as a boundarv. 
Respectfully submijtted^thi^ /) //day of January, 1996. 
v/^]A^^^ 
Jter^ &ph ^ arlan Burns 
z^£torney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
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A D D E N D U M 
the Court having received evidence, heard testimony or witnesses, 
argument of counsel, and having reviewed the file and good cause 
appearing the Court now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That jurisdiction and venue are proper. 
2. That Plaintiffs' claim is not procluded by the Doctrine of 
Res Judicate. 
3. That Plaintiff's claim is not procluded by the Doctrine of 
Colleteral Estoppel. 
4. That Plaintiffs' claims for Trespass, Boundry by 
Acquiescence and Damages together with all other claims asserted in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint are dismissed, the Plaintiffs having failed 
to prove Boundry by Acquiesence, Trespass or Damages resulting from 
Defendants' improvement and upgrade of an existing lane along and 
within the deeded right of way to Defendants' property. 
From the above Findings of Fact this Court now concludes: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Doctrine of Res Judicate does not proclude Plaintiffs' 
claims as a matter of law. 
2. The Doctrine of Colleteral Estoppel does not proclude 
Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law. 
3. Plaintiffs' claims for Trespass, Boundry by Acquiesence 
and Damages, together with all other claims asserted in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, are dismissed with prejudice and on the merits as 
against these Defendants, the Plaintiffs having failed to establish 
Boundry by Acquiesence, Trespass, or Damages resulting from 
Defendants' improvement of an existing lane within and along the 
deeded right of way to Defendants' property. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of this Court this day of 
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THE COURT: All right. Obviously there can be 
no trespass if, in fact, Mr. Riker was privileged by the 
exercise of an easement which he had acquired to traverse 
the property that he traversed in putting in his road. 
He's entitled to remove obstructions from that right-of-way 
if he has a right-of-way that he can use. 
The question then becomes whether or not the 
right to use that property is controlled by deeds and 
surveys, or whether it's controlled by the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
Boundary by acquiescence has specific elements 
which must be established. There must be occupation up to 
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings. 
Obviously that's been established. Mr. Parkinson and 
others have testified that the property on both sides of 
the fence — fence was fully occupied. 
There must be mutual acquiescence in the fence 
in this case as a boundary. That has been — not been 
proven by the plaintiff. I have no evidence whatsoever as 
to who put in the fence or for what purpose. I don't even 
know when it was put in. The evidence I do have shows that 
this same person owned both sides of at least the bottom 
portion of that fence as early as 1925, as I recall. But 
let me look. 
MR. JACKSON: 28, Your Honor. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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THE COURT: 28. 1928. 
Obviously there can't be a boundary by 
acquiescence where a fence runs through property owned on 
both sides by the same owner. You can't agree by yourself 
to make this a boundary across your own property. That's 
nonsensical. Besides which, the fourth element of boundary 
by acquiescence is that it has to be a boundary between 
adjoining property owners. And those have to be different 
property owners. So there has been no evidence that the 
fence was ever intended as a boundary by whoever put it 
in. And we don't know who that was. 
Now the question becomes did anybody in the 
intervening years from the time it was put in until now 
mutually agree that that was going to be the boundary of 
the property. I have no evidence that that's ever taken 
place. We've had lots of people own property along that 
fence on both sides, but I have no evidence that anybody 
ever agreed that was going to be a boundary line. The 
fence has just sat there, and people have bought and taken 
title to property in accordance with the general legal 
descriptions that are laid out by survey. No evidence has 
been presented that would indicate that anybody ever agreed 
that that fence line was going to be the boundary between 
these two pieces of property at any point versus the — the 
survey line. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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So I find that the plaintiff has failed to 
establish boundary by acquiescence. 
I granted the Motion — or I denied the Motion 
to Dismiss after the plaintiffs' case, as I said, because I 
wanted to give the — the benefit of the doubt to the 
plaintiff and give the defendant an opportunity to present 
their evidence. But the defendants' evidence as presented 
by Mr. Dalton clearly indicates that Arnold Parkinson owned 
this property way back. And whether he built the fence, I 
don't know. But that's as far back as the evidence goes. 
And at that time, the fence, if it was there, ran through 
his property, not adjoining — not across adjoining — or 
between adjoining pieces. 
Given that, the question — I — the question is 
is the fence — may Mr. Riker remove the fence? The survey 
shows that the fence was on his property. And it's his 
fence. He can do what he wants with it. In addition, he 
had a right to an easement which was deeded to him properly 
and which is of record. 
So I'm going to find in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiffs and find that the plaintiffs 
have no cause of action, they having failed in their proof. 
MR. JACKSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, may we have findings of 
fact and conclusions of law? 
PAULO. MCMULLIN 
